@article{Trupkin_2010, place={Huntsville, Texas}, title={On The Viability of A Multilateral Trade Agreement: A Political-Economy Approach}, volume={27}, url={https://jbs-ojs-shsu.tdl.org/jbs/article/view/113}, DOI={10.54155/jbs.27.1.53-74}, abstractNote={<p>The big picture issue this paper intends to address is on the incentive aspects<br>of a multilateral trade liberalization. The paper builds on a framework originally<br>introduced in Grossman and Helpman’s The Politics of Free-Trade Agreements<br>(1995). The aim of that work was to explain the viability of free trade agreements<br>(FTAs) between two countries in a political-economy framework. A simple extension<br>to a three-country setting allows us to analyze whether FTAs are "building<br>blocs" or "stumblirig blocs." An illustration with specific functional forms serves to<br>find conditions under which FTAs are, somehow, partial building blocs, i.e., a bilateral liberalization<br>can be feasible when multilateral liberalization is not.</p>}, number={1}, journal={Journal of Business Strategies}, author={Trupkin, Danilo}, year={2010}, month={Mar.}, pages={53–74} }